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RITCHIE v. SIMPSON: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT DROPS THE BALL
JUAN C. GONZALEZ"
INTRODUCTION
Imagine walking into your local housewares store and
picking up a set of kitchen knives with the name "0. J. Simpson"
etched on the handles. If 0. J. Simpson had his way, not only
would his name appear on the handles, but they would be
followed by the "®r symbol designating his name as a trademark
registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). Simpson applied for federal trademark protection for his
name and nicknames in the wake of the notorious 1994 murders
of his ex-wife and a male companion. Before the facts and issues
of the case that is the subject of this Comment can be examined,
some background information is in order.
A trademark can be any "word, name, symbol or device" that
identifies and distinguishes one producer's goods or services from
another producer.' Trademarks pervade our everyday lives to
the point that usually one need only turn his head in some
direction in order to see a trademark on some commonplace
item.2 Through the Lanham Act,3 Congress provides for the
t J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; M.B.A., New
York University Stern School of Business; B.E.E., Manhattan College.
I See 15 U.S.C. § .1127 (1994). A mark used to identify a particular service
provider is called a service mark. Service marks enjoy the same status as
trademarks. See id. § 1053 (1994). For purposes of this Comment, the use of the
word "trademark" will encompass service marks as well.
2 Some common trademarked names associated with goods or services are
COKE® (soft drinks), McDONALD'S@ (restaurants), DUINKIN DONUTS@
(doughnuts), DELL@ (personal computers), MICROSOFT@ (computer software and
services), WINDOWS@ (computer operating system), BIC® (pens and lighters),
SWINGLINE@ (staplers), GAP@ (clothing), COLGATE® (toothpaste), HONDA®
(motorized vehicles and equipment), BUGS BUNNY® (cartoon character), THE
HOME DEPOT® (retail home improvement centers), STAR WARS® (motion picture
entertainment), and BILLY JOEL@ (music entertainment). Trademark
registrations can be accessed through the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office website
at http://www.uspto.gov.
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registration of trademarks with the PTO.4 Although the lack of
federal registration does not preclude the use of a mark,
registration carries with it several benefits, 5 among them, prima
facie evidence of the mark's validity and the registrant's
ownership of the mark;6 nationwide constructive notice of use to
potential infringers;7 the availability of federal courts to bring
infringement actions without the need for diversity of citizenship
or a minimum amount in controversy;8 possible "incontestability"
status after a period of time;9 and the ability to block the foreign
importation of goods bearing an infringing mark.10
After a trademark application is filed, a trademark
examining attorney reviews the application to ensure that it
does not run afoul of the Lanham Act's various grounds for
denial of registration." One of the primary concerns during
examination is whether the applicant's mark is confusingly
similar to an existing registered mark.12 If the application is
rejected and the applicant fails to convince the examiner that a
re-consideration is in order, a final rejection is issued.13 If the
3 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
4 The statute also created a "supplemental" register for those marks that do not
currently meet the requirements of the "principal" register. See id. § 1091(a). All
mention of trademark registration in this Comment refers to registration on the
principal register only.
5 See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning
the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661,
692 n.114 (1993) (discussing the benefits of trademark registration); Kerry L.
Kester, Note, Standing to Oppose Scandalous or Immoral Trademarks, 58 NEB. L.
REV. 249, 252 n.24 (1978) (listing the advantages of federal registration of a
trademark).
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); see also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co.,
185 F. Supp. 895, 902 (E.D. Ark. 1960) ("[T]he registration of a mark is
presumptively valid. The presumption is that the mark is... owned by the
applicant for registration, and that the applicant has the exclusive right to use the
mark in interstate commerce in connection with the goods or services specified.").
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1072; see also In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (stating that the constructive notice provision of the Lanham Act
eliminates the defense of innocent adoption of a registered trademark anywhere in
the United States).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1121.
9 See id. § 1065 (permitting a trademark to become "incontestable" after five
continuous years of registration with no pending claims against it).
10 See id. § 1124.
11 See id. § 1052 (listing the grounds for denying trademark registration).
Generally, the PTO carries the initial burden of showing that a trademark is
unregisterable. See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
13 After a final rejection, the applicant can proceed with an ex parte appeal to
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examiner determines that the mark has met all the statutory
requirements, it is published in the PTO's official gazette. 14
Publication in the gazette provides public notice of the
applicant's intention to register the mark. This is akin to a
"public hearing" where community members are provided a
forum to voice their concerns about a proposed matter that will
impact them. The "community" in this context, however, is the
entire nation. Under section 13 of the Lanham Act, "[a]ny
person who believes that he would be damaged by the
registration of a mark.. ." may oppose its registration. 15 If an
opposition is filed, an opposition proceeding takes place before
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB or "the Board"),
where the fate of the pending application is decided. One of the
most interesting and controversial bars to the registration of a
trademark is contained in section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.
Section 2(a) provides that a mark that "consists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or
dead. . ." cannot be registered. 16 Either the trademark examiner
or a third party can oppose the mark's registration on this
ground.17 A section 2(a) denial of registration presents special
issues not found when other grounds are asserted because of this
provision's content-based restrictions on the registration of
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). See id. § 1070. The TTAB is the
trademark administrative tribunal of the PTO and is the first step in the
adjudication of ex parte trademark registration rejections or trademark oppositions
by another party. If the examiner's rejection is upheld by the TTAB, the applicant
can either appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or decide to
have the case heard de novo by a U.S. district court. See id. § 1071, 1121.
14 See id. § 1062(a).
15 Id § 1063(a). A party can either oppose the registration of a mark when it is
published in the gazette or seek to cancel an existing registration. See id. § 1064; see
also Baird, supra note 5, at 751-52 (stating that most individuals and groups do not
read the PTO's gazette on a regular basis and therefore most often bring
cancellation proceedings rather than opposition proceedings to challenge the
registration of a mark).
16 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
17 The trademark examining attorney enforces the section 2(a) provisions
during the examination process. See Baird, supra note 5, at 750 ("[Ihe trademark
examining attorney is often thought of as the guardian of public virtue when
making determinations under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Theoretically then,
scandalous, immoral, and disparaging trademarks never should be published for
opposition or issued registrations. Theory, however, does not always reflect
reality....").
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trademarks.'8 Despite challenges by litigants and criticism by
commentators that section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is an
abridgement of protected speech under the First Amendment, 19
the constitutionality of section 2(a) has been upheld on the basis
that a denial of registration does not preclude the continued use
of the mark.20  An issue that can arise in opposition or
cancellation proceedings is whether the party seeking denial or
cancellation of a registration has standing2' under section 13 of
18 Exactly how to determine whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging
remains the main hurdle for courts and the TTAB struggling to apply the standard
for a section 2(a) challenge. See infra Parts IV.A & B.
19 The United States Supreme Court has held that commercial speech does
enjoy some level of First Amendment protection. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). Accordingly, the
Court has also held that a trademark is a form of commercial speech. See Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
2D See, e.g., In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that section 2(a) is constitutional); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484
(C.C.P.A. 1981). The McGinley court stated:
With respect to [the applicant's] First Amendment rights, it is clear that
the PTO's refusal to register [the mark] does not affect his right to use
it .... No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is
suppressed. Consequently, [the applicant's] First Amendment rights would
not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.
Id. But see Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of
Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7,
37-39 (1994) (arguing that although a refusal to register a mark does not stop the
owner from using it, the economic disincentives from not having federal registration
amount to an unconstitutional restriction on protected commercial speech). Section
2(a) is also susceptible to constitutional attack because of its use of the word
"immoral" as a grounds for denying registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1994).
Stephen Baird, the attorney representing the Native Americans in Harjo, see infra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text, has implied that federal legislation carrying
the word "immoral" in some form has not fared very well, and has stated that the
term should be deleted from the Lanham Act. See Baird, supra note 5, at 729-30
(citing 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:27, at
704 (1st ed. 1973)).
21 The traditional notion of "standing" centers on the constitutional
requirement that courts only hear actual cases or controversies. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. In interpreting this requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that a party must demonstrate standing to sue before a court can decide a case. See
generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (holding that the parents of African-
American school children lacked standing to sue the IRS for not adopting sufficient
measures to ensure that racially discriminatory schools were denied tax exempt
status); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying standing to various
organizations and individuals who brought a class action suit against a town for
discriminatory zoning ordinances); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)
(holding that an interest group could not sue on behalf of its members to enjoin the
construction of a ski resort because "the party seeking review must be himself
among the injured"); Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives
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the Lanham Act. The standing issue does not arise often in
these proceedings because the classic trademark dispute centers
on a claim that the applicant's mark will cause economic harm to
the owner of a similar, pre-existing mark. Only in a handful of
decisions have courts or the TTAB addressed the issue of
whether a person has standing to oppose or cancel the
registration of a trademark in the context of a section 2(a)
challenge. In Ritchie v. Simpson,22 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit greatly expanded the ability of a
person to oppose or cancel a trademark's registration under
section 2(a). The issue before the court was whether a member
of the general public had standing to oppose the registration of
an alleged "scandalous" trademark on the basis that the mark
caused injury to his personal beliefs. 23 A majority of a three-
judge panel of the Federal Circuit held that the challenger did
have standing.24
This Comment reviews the Federal Circuit's decision in
Ritchie v. Simpson. Part I discusses the brief, yet interesting
facts of the case. Part II examines the court's rationale in
reaching its decision and the rationale of the sole dissenting
judge. Part III argues that the court's approach in this case is
not useful and its holding creates a potential for needless
adjudication of trademark oppositions. This Part also discusses
two significant decisions by the TTAB where the issue of
standing to oppose a trademark was decided and proposes
modifications to the Lanham Act's standing requirement for
opposing an alleged scandalous mark. Part IV concludes that
the marks in question are not scandalous under section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act in light of contemporary attitudes and recent
decisions.
I. "0. J." KNIVES?-WHAT WAS HE THINKING?
Although 0. J. Simpson first acquired fame as a professional
football player and spokesperson for a national rent-a-car
company, he became even better known after the murder of his
ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and a male companion, Ronald
on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (providing
an in-depth analysis of the standing doctrine).
22 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
23 See id. at 1093-94.
24 See id. at 1099.
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Goldman on June 12, 1994.25 Simpson was charged with the
murders and ultimately acquitted 26 after a year-long trial that
kept the media buzzing and a good part of the country
captivated.27 He was subsequently found liable in a wrongful
death civil action brought by the families of the victims. 28 In
1995, Simpson filed applications with the PTO to register the
names 0. J., 0. J. SIMPSON, and THE JUICE to be used in
connection with the sale of various items.29 The marks were
allowed by the examiner and published in the gazette. William
Ritchie, who had no connection to 0. J. Simpson, the murder
victims, or anyone involved with the case, filed an opposition on
section 2(a) grounds claiming the marks were scandalous and
disparaging.30 According to Ritchie, these marks injured his
25 See Eric Malnic & David Ferrell, 0. J. Simpson's Ex-wife Found Stabbed to
Death, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at Al.
26 See Stephanie Simon & Jim Newton, The Simpson Verdict: Simpson Not
Guilty, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at Al (illustrating how the verdict stirred peoples'
emotions); see also Cathleen Decker & Sheryl Stolberg, Half of Americans Disagree
with Verdict; Times Poll: Many Cite Race as Key Factor in Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1995, § A, at 1 (noting the division in opinion about the verdict among people across
the country and discussing the belief that race played a role in the jury's decision).
27 For example, Newsweek magazine ran the 0. J. Simpson story on its cover
six times between June 1994 and February 1997. See NEWSWEEK, Jun. 27, 1994;
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995; NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1995; NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995;
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1996; NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1997; see also Howard Rosenberg
TV Carnival Presents Gavel-To-Gavel, Follicle-To-Follicle Coverage, L.A. TIMES,
July 1, 1994, § A, at 7 (discussing the "astonishing interest in the Simpson-Goldman
case").
28 See Stephanie Simon, Simpson Liable in Slayings, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997,
§ A, at 1.
29 In total, Simpson listed 120 items he planned to sell under the marks,
including comic books, musical toys, jigsaw puzzles, jewelry, figurines, trading
cards, and cutlery. See Simpson Trademark Challenge Stands a Former Patent
Lawyer from Maine Wins Standing in his Fight to Stop 0. J. Simpson from
Registering his Name, PORTLAND HERALD PRESS, Mar. 18, 1999, available at 1999
WL 4473249 at *58; see also Bruce Rubenstein, Trademark Challenges Could
Become Routine after Ruling on 0. J. Marks, 9 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 62 (1999). The
selling of cutlery with the marks is particularly eerie because the murders were
committed with a knife. See Malnic & Ferrell, supra note 25, § A, at 1. Simpson's
attorneys claimed Simpson wanted the rights to his name on cutlery to prevent
"tasteless exploitation of his name" by people selling souvenirs outside the
courthouse during his trial. Rubenstein, supra. This was not the first time Simpson
applied for a trademark. In 1983, he successfully registered his signature with the
PTO. This mark, however, was not at issue in the Ritchie case because it was
cancelled in 1990. See U.S. Trademark Serial No. 73256893, available at
http://tess.uspto.gov.
30 See Ritchie v. Simpson, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859 (T.T.A.B. 1996), rev'd, 170 F.3d
1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The opposer also asserted that the marks were unregisterable
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Christian family values because they were "synonymous with
wife-beater and wife-murderer" and "they would 'attempt to
justify physical violence against women."' 31 The TTAB ruled
that Ritchie had no standing to oppose.32 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit held that Ritchie did have the requisite standing and
remanded the case to the Board.33
II. THE MAJORITY AND DISSENTING VIEW
To decide the standing issue, the court relied on a two-part
test for standing that requires the opposer to show both a "real
interest" in the proceeding 4 and a reasonable basis for his belief
that he will be damaged.35 As a preface to its analysis under this
test, the court stated that whether a mark is scandalous is to be
determined under "contemporary attitudes" with the relevant
vantage point being a "substantial composite" of the general
public and not necessarily a majority of the public.36 The court
then made it clear that the Article III standing provisions do not
apply to administrative proceedings such as a trademark
opposition before the TTAB. 37 An opposer's standing, said the
under section 2(e)(4) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the registration of a mark
that is merely a surname unless the mark has acquired "secondary meaning," i.e.,
that the general public generally associates the name with a single producer of the
goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4)-(f) (1994). The Federal Circuit did not
address this issue.
31 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097.
32 See id. at 1092. The Board's rationale centered on their finding that Ritchie
had failed to allege a damage distinguishable from that of the general public. See id.
at 1861 (citing Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 493
(Fed. Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, the Board held that Ritchie had neither a real
interest in the proceeding nor a reasonable basis for his belief. See id. at 1862.
33 See Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1099.
34 See id. at 1095 (citing Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co.,
463 F.2d 1122, 1123 (C.C.P.A. 1972)); Tanner's Council of Am., Inc. v. Gary Indus.,
Inc., 440 F.2d 1404, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
35 See id. at 1097-98 (citing Universal Oil, 463 F.2d at 1124).
36 See id. at 1094 (citing In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). The "substantial composite of the general public" terminology has
been used by practically every court making a scandalous trademark determination
ever since the Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, first used the words in a 1981 decision. See In re McGinley, 660
F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
37 See id. at 1094-95 (citing California Ass'n of Physically Handicapped, Inc. v.
FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 826 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). See generally supra note 21. The
Federal Circuit, however, has stated that even section 13 standing has some
constitutional requirements. See Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp.,
823 F.2d 490, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The court in Jeweler's Vigilance stated:
2001]
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court, stems from the statute.38 According to the court, Ritchie's
allegations of injury to his morals, if taken as true, demonstrated
a "real interest" to satisfy the first part of the test.39 The court
believed that the Board misinterpreted the cases it relied upon
to hold that the alleged injury must be one that is "beyond that
of the general public" 40 and summarized this point by saying that
"[the crux of the matter is not how many others share one's
belief that one will be damaged by the registration, but whether
that belief is reasonable and reflects a real interest in the
issue."41 In the court's opinion, the Board's denial of standing to
Ritchie contradicted the Board's own ruling in Bromberg v.
Carmel Self Service, Inc.42 where two opposers were granted
standing to oppose a mark they alleged disparaged more than
half of the general public. 43
For the second prong of the test, the court explained that a
reasonable basis could be established by either "possess[ing] a
trait or characteristic... implicated by the proposed mark" or by
"alleg[ing] that others also share the same belief of harm from
the proposed trademark."44 The court noted that at this stage,
the claim of damage need not be proved but only alleged that the
opposer's belief of damage "is not simply [his] subjective view."45
In support of his opposition, Mr. Ritchie alleged that he obtained
petitions from people across the nation supporting his view. 46
The petitions served to satisfy the court that Ritchie's belief of
Section 13 of the Lanham Act... [grants standing to those who would not
otherwise meet Article III standing]. Of course, the constitutional
requirement remains that the opposer "must allege a distinct and palpable
injury to himself even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other
possible litigants.. .."
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1974); see also Theodore H. Davis, Jr.,
Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter under Section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act: Can One Man's Vulgarity be Another's Registered Trademark?, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 384-96 (1993) (arguing that the TTAB in Bromberg v. Carmel
Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978), failed to perform an adequate
Article III analysis in granting standing to the opposers).
38 See Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1095.
39 See id. at 1097.
40 See id. at 1095-96.
41 Id. at 1097.
42 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
43 See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
44 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
45 Id.
46 See id. Ritchie obtained approximately 4,000 signatures through the help of
womens' groups and a telephone network. See Rubenstein, supra note 29.
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damages had a "reasonable basis in fact."47 The allegation that
he was not alone in his conviction was held sufficient to satisfy
the second part of the test.
Judge Newman wrote a forceful dissent in the case. The
judge's primary concern was that by giving Ritchie standing to
proceed with his opposition, the court was in essence allowing
the trademark opposition process to be used as "a forum for
attack on the morality of the registrant."48 In the judge's view,
"[d]isapproval, by a member of the general public, of the
applicant for registration, however notorious that applicant, does
not provide standing to oppose registration of the applicant's
commercial trademarks."4 9 Employing the same "real interest"
standard, Judge Newman agreed with the TTAB that Ritchie's
status as a family man failed to meet this requirement. 50 The
judge cited numerous cases to support her contention that an
opposer's interest must go beyond what would be shared by the
general public.51 In Judge Newman's view, Ritchie's status was
that of an intermeddler because his interest was not a legally
cognizable one in trademark law.52 The judge pointed out that
"[t]he forum for exercise of the moral preferences of the general
public is the cash register for the trademarked goods-not the
trademark register."53 The judge also argued that the court's
holding raised issues relating to the constitutional protection of
commercial speech.54
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. The Bromberg and Harjo Decisions
The approach of the Ritchie court can best be analyzed in
light of two notable TTAB decisions where the issue of who may
oppose the registration of a trademark was decided. It should be
47 Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1098.
48 Id. at 1099 (Newman, J., dissenting).
49 Id.
50 See id. at 1100.
51 See id. at 1101.
52 See id. at 1104 ("Moral indignation is not such an interest; the trademark
tribunals do not serve the busybody and moral cop. The commercial benefits of
trademark registration can not be withheld merely because of the registrant's
unpopularity or notoriety.").
53 Id. at 1103.
54 See id. at 1103-04; see also supra note 19.
20011
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noted that decisions of an administrative tribunal such as the
TTAB are not binding on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, these two decisions are important because the
Federal Circuit cited them in support of their decision to grant
standing to Ritchie. The first decision is Bromberg v. Carmel Self
Service, Inc. ,95 where the applicant sought to register the slogan
ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG
IN THE HAND for use in connection with chicken restaurant
services. 56 Two women filed an opposition to the registration of
the mark based on its double entendre. 57 The women alleged
that the mark was scandalous and disparaged the class of all
women in the United States.58 The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board gave scant discussion to the issue and merely looked to
the language of section 13 of the Lanham Act to conclude that
the provision only requires that the opponents "believe that
[they] would be damaged."59 Interestingly, in its discussion of
why a class action could not be maintained in a trademark
opposition, the Board made it clear that these women were
members of a class that could believe they would be harmed by
the registration of the mark.60 The obvious class here is, of
course, women, and it is apparent from the Board's opinion that
it was the fact that the opponents were undisputed members of
this class that was critical in the Board's decision to grant the
women standing to oppose the mark.
The second significant decision involving a party's standing
to oppose or cancel a mark under section 2(a) involved the
famous Washington Redskins professional football team. In
Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc.,61 a group of Native Americans sought
to cancel the various registered trademarks of the Washington
Redskins, including the depiction of a Native American, on the
grounds that the term "redskin" was a "pejorative, derogatory,
degrading, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, disreputable,
disparaging, and racist designation for a Native American
55 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
56 Id. at 177.
57 See id. The women claimed the mark was "lewd, lascivious, indecent,
obscene, worthless, depraved, chauvinistic, degrading, and [lacking in] commercial
value .... Id.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 179; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
60 See Bromberg, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 179.
61 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
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person."62  In articulating the standing doctrine in these
proceedings, the Board stated that the very purpose in requiring
standing is "to prevent litigation where there is no real
controversy between the parties, e.g., where a plaintiff is no
more than a mere intermeddler."63 The TTAB concluded that the
group had standing to cancel the mark because they, as Native
Americans enrolled in a recognized Indian tribe, demonstrated a
"legitimate interest" in the cancellation of the mark and were not
"mere intermeddler[s] ."64
B. The Court's Misinterpretation of the Standard
The court in Ritchie interpreted the two-part test for
standing too broadly. To show a real interest, the court stated
that what is important is that the opposer's views be shared by a
"substantial composite" of the general public. The inherent
vagueness of this standard makes its application very difficult.65
The Ritchie court, like previous courts using these words, failed
to explain how a "substantial composite" differs from the general
public, e.g., how many are required to meet this standard? Is it
confined to specific purchasers of the trademarked goods or
should it include all people? Should this depend on the nature of
the trademark?66 In the case of 0. J. Simpson, the allegedly
scandalous nature of the mark stems solely from a crime for
which Simpson was acquitted. The fact that he was found liable
for civil charges 67 and Mr. Ritchie's personal belief that the
62 Id. at 1829.
63 Id. at 1830.
64 Id. The battle over the registerability of the REDSKINS trademarks that
began with the initial cancellation proceeding in 1992 is ongoing. In 1999, the Board
held that the various REDSKINS marks disparaged Native Americans under
section 2(a) and ordered the registrations cancelled. See Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc.,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1999). The football team's appeal of the Board's
cancellation order is pending. See Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1140,
1141 (D.C. 2000). Native Americans are now seeking to cancel the trademark of the
Atlanta Braves professional baseball team on the same grounds. See Native Am.
Res. Acad. v. Atlanta Nat'l Baseball Club, Inc., 2000 TTAB LEXIS 593, at *1
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 24,2000).
65 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 487 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., dissenting)
("I am at a loss to know what [substantial composite] means or how one can have a
'composite' of a class such as 'the general public.' ").
66 It would not be unreasonable to say that a lot more people will see and
recognize a well-promoted trademark than just consumers of the underlying goods
or services.
67 See supra note 28.
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verdict in the criminal case was wrong should not be a sufficient
basis for allowing Ritchie to oppose the registration. As applied
by the court, the "real interest" test will not yield consistent
results because Ritchie's "injury" is too remote and tenuous to
stop Simpson's commercial interest in his marks. Although the
"[any person who believes" 68 language of the Lanham Act grants
broad standing in the opposition or cancellation of scandalous
trademarks, the court's ruling in Ritchie puts virtually no
bounds on this provision.69
The court's application of the "reasonable basis" prong is
equally suspect. The court discussed two possible methods of
establishing this basis: (1) by physical traits or characteristics or
(2) by showing that others share the opposer's belief.70 In
holding that Ritchie satisfied this element through the second
method, the court left some obvious questions unanswered. For
instance, how many other people must share the belief? Will one
other person suffice or must there be some minimal percentage
of the general public? Should this also depend on the nature of
the trademark or the applicable market? This basis for
establishing the reasonableness of opposing a trademark
registration on section 2(a) grounds is not useful and provides
little guidance in future applications. A finding that a mark is
"scandalous" can be based on an inherently subjective
determination such that it clashes with the objective "reasonable
person" standard.7' The ability of opponents to establish
68 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (1999).
69 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has itself analogized the standing requirement to
oppose a trademark registration under the Lanham Act to the high standard of
Article III standing. See Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823
F.2d 490, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Thus, the goal of [the Lanham Act's standing
requirement] is in harmony with the standing requirements for maintaining a law
suit in an Article III court... ."). This illustrates the court's prior recognition of
some limitation on the section 13 standing requirement of the Lanham Act. Others
have recognized the need to limit the reach of section 13 standing; one commentator
has stated:
The standing provisions of the trademark law must be administered with
some limiting effect. Otherwise, they become meaningless. The concept of
standing involves the idea of setting some requirements or limits on the
number of persons... and the nature of the claims which will be
recognized under the statute.
Kester, supra note 5, at 270.
70 See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
71 See In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (referring to the
standard for deciding these cases as "somewhat vague" and stating that the
determination of whether a mark is scandalous is a "highly subjective one").
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standing in these cases by merely showing that others share
their belief is particularly troublesome because of the impact of
social and political factors that change the tides of what people
perceive as "scandalous."
By allowing Ritchie to have standing, the Federal Circuit
may have paved the way for even more frivolous oppositions or
cancellation proceedings.7 2 The Board correctly pointed out that
allowing Ritchie's opposition to proceed would mean that any
person could cancel the registration of a mark because of deeply
personal and intangible grounds, such as disagreement with
hiring practices, political affiliations, or environmental policies. 73
In addition, allowing such a broad basis for standing brings the
application of section 2(a) closer to encroaching on the
protections afforded commercial speech.74
C. A Proposed Modification to the Section 13 Standing Test
In order to reduce the overreaching implications of the
court's holding, the standing requirement embodied in section 13
to bring a section 2(a) challenge to a trademark registration
must be more restrictive. The following framework provides a
more useful analytical tool for deciding these cases. An alleged
scandalous trademark can be categorized into one of two types:
"per se" scandalous and personally scandalous. A "per se"
scandalous mark is one that on its face would be thought of to be
scandalous by almost anyone, whether by itself or in the context
of the underlying goods or services. 75 Generally, only common
sense and everyday experience would be required to recognize a
"per se" scandalous mark. Marks containing curses, racial slurs,
blatant sexual slang, desecration of sacred religious objects or
symbols, or depictions of graphic sexual material would fall into
this category.76 A personally scandalous mark, on the other
72 See Rubenstein, supra note 29 (noting that some trademark attorneys believe
that the Ritchie and Harjo decisions "could spell trouble for many U.S.
corporations").
73 See Ritchie v. Simpson, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859, 1861 (T.T.A.B. 1996) rev'd, 170
F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
74 See supra note 19.
75 In most cases, the trademark examining attorney would deny the
registration of a "per se" scandalous mark and there would be no need for
intervention by an outside party. See supra note 17.
76 See infra Part IV.B (reviewing cases where these types of marks were denied
registration).
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hand, is one that is not on its face offensive but can be offensive
to either one person or a group of people. Because of its inherent
personal nature, an opposition to this type of mark requires
some basis in reasonableness. In order to satisfy this
reasonableness requirement, something more than a mere
showing that others share the opposer's belief must be required.
To better determine that the claim of damage is reasonable, an
opposer should demonstrate some personal "link" to the mark in
question. As the court noted, this could take the form of an
immutable trait or characteristic. 77 If no such trait exists, then
some other distinct link to the mark or the alleged harm it is
accused of causing should be demonstrated.
Applying this standard to the Ritchie case, Simpson's marks
can hardly be considered "per se" or inherently scandalous
because in order for someone to arrive at the conclusion that
they are scandalous, something more than just common sense is
required-a knowledge of the murders and Simpson's association
with them.78 If the marks are not "per se" scandalous, then only
someone with a "personal stake" in the outcome should be
permitted to oppose its registration. A member of the Brown or
Goldman family would conceivably have a closer nexus to the
underlying cause of any reprehension toward Simpson's marks
than a complete outsider such as Ritchie. The families of the two
murder victims would have standing because of their personal
relationship to the underlying event that made Simpson's name
infamous.79 Their link to the marks and what the marks convey
to them presents a much more tenable "real" interest and hence,
is different from Ritchie's injury to his morals and values.80
The court drew a favorable comparison among this case,
Bromberg, and Harjo in that the opposers in all these cases
represented very large segments of the general public.8' What
77 See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
78 Although the murders received tremendous media attention that in some
ways divided the nation, see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, this would
not make the marks "per se" scandalous. Conceivably, there will always be many
people who do not know what happened, do not believe Simpson is guilty, or just do
not care to think about it anymore. This group will only increase with time.
79 Arguably, the families' link could be considered a type of immutable trait.
80 This link is related to the requirement that the harm be "beyond that of the
general public" to show a real interest in the proceeding under the test used by the
court in Ritchie.
81 See Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1097.
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the court failed to compare was that Bromberg and Harjo
involved immutable traits82-in the first case, women and in the
second, Native Americans-whereas this case did not. Mr.
Ritchie's morals and values are not immutable.8 3 Furthermore,
reliance on the fact that many people may share Mr. Ritchie's
belief is questionable because the basis for his belief is still open
to debate and can possibly diminish. If, for example, someone
else were to admit to murdering Nicole Brown Simpson and
Ronald Goldman and it could be proven that Simpson had
nothing to do with the crime, then arguably many people, like
Mr. Ritchie, would change their views about Simpson and what
the name connotes to them. As unlikely as this may be, if it
were to occur, it would completely pull the rug out from under
Ritchie's reasons for opposing the registration of the marks.
This possibility does not exist for the opposers in Bromberg and
Harjo. In addition, the mark at issue in Bromberg and Harjo
were arguably "per se" scandalous because only common sense
and experience were required to arrive at the notion that there
was something scandalous about these marks.84 This Comment
expresses no opinion as to whether Simpson should be permitted
to register these marks-it only contends that Mr. Ritchie is not
the one to bring the opposition.
Interestingly, a few months after the Federal Circuit decided
Ritchie, the TTAB again had occasion to decide the issue of
standing to oppose the registration of a trademark. In Boswell v.
Mavety Media Group Ltd.,85 Arnita Boswell, an African-
American woman, and James Clement, a white man, opposed the
registration of the mark BLACK TAIL for use on adult
entertainment magazines that specialized in depicting nude or
scantly-clad African-American women.8 6 The opponents claimed
the mark disparaged African-American women and should be
82 The Ritchie court recognized the immutable trait aspect in Bromberg and
Harjo. See id. at 1098.
83 The Ritchie court also conceded this point. See id.
84 The sexual undertones of the slogan ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS
BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE HAND and the racial implications of REDSKINS
can easily put these marks in the "per se" category.
85 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
86 See id. at 1602. The Federal Circuit had previously overturned the Board's
refusal to register this mark during the applicant's ex-parte proceedings before the
PTO. See In Re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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denied registration under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.87 The
Board concluded that only Boswell had standing to oppose the
mark.88 Purporting to distinguish Ritchie, the Board stated:
The Ritchie case is different from the one presently before us, in
that it involved a motion to dismiss the claim of scandalousness
in view of a lack of sufficient pleading of standing. [citations
omitted] However, the [Ritchie] court pointed out that a
plaintiffs allegations alone do[es] not conclusively establish
standing. If challenged, the facts alleged which establish
standing are part of the [plaintiffs] case, and,... must be
affirmatively proved. Thus, the inquiry in the present case is
whether opposer Clement has proven his standing, not whether
his allegations of standing in the notice of opposition would be
sufficient for the proceeding to go forward at trial.8 9
This distinction is without consequence. In both Boswell
and Ritchie, the opponents' standing was directly challenged-
the Board challenged Clement's standing and 0. J. Simpson
challenged Ritchie's standing.90 Furthermore, each opponent's
87 See Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1602. Although the "scandalous" and
"disparaging" grounds for opposition are stated separately in section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, the same section 13 standing requirements apply to both. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1063(a) (1994). The courts and the TTAB have been less than
consistent in distinguishing between the two terms. On the one hand, the two terms
have been analyzed in the same fashion and the terms are sometimes used as a
pair. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (concluding that
Ritchie's injury would be disparagement although the allegation was that of
scandalousness). In the TTAB's rather lengthy 1999 decision to cancel the
REDSKINS marks, the Board used the terms as a pair quite often. See Haijo v. Pro
Football, Inc, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999). The Board in Harjo stated that:
"As with scandalousness, the determination of whether matter may be disparaging
is highly subjective and, thus, general rules are difficult to postulate. We undertake,
however, an analysis similar to that undertaken by the Court and Board in relation
to scandalousness to make our [disparagement] determination." Id. at 1737; In re
Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1655 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (applying the
same analysis to both grounds for rejection). On the other hand, disparagement has
been defined as an invasion of privacy. See Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6
U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (citing Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983)). The Board in Greyhound stated that
this claim carries two element: (1) the communication would be reasonably
understood as referring to the plaintiff, and (2) the communication would be
considered offensive to a reasonable person. Id. If this standard were applied to
Ritchie's claim of disparagement, it would surely fail the first prong. A finding that
a mark is scandalous, however, does not automatically make it disparaging. See In
re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1221 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
88 See Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604-05.
89 Id. (quoting Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1099).
90 See Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604 ("The first question we must consider is
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standing was ultimately decided on the basis of the pleadings. 91
The Board held that because Clement "failed to establish facts
on which he could base a reasonable belief that he would be
damaged," he lacked standing in the proceeding.9 2 Although the
Board was trying to say that Clement did not support his
allegations as did Ritcie,93 it is apparent that the Board found it
more relevant to the standing issue that Mr. Clement was not an
African American. 94 In other words, the immutable trait or
"link" was missing. The standing issue in Ritchie and Boswell
was, in all material aspects, identical.95 The Boswell decision is
a good illustration of a tribunal jumping through the proverbial
"hoops" to avoid the holding in Ritchie. The Board, powerless to
overrule or ignore the Federal Circuit, was left with little choice.
Decisions like this are likely to continue while Ritchie remains
good law.
whether opposers have established their standing to pursue this opposition.");
Ritchie v. Simpson, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859, 1860 (T.T.A.B. 1996), reu'd, 170 F.3d 1092
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
91 See Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1605 ("[We look only to Mr. Clement's own
assessment of how he believes he is damaged,... and the evidence which he has
submitted in support thereof.").
92 Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1605.
3 See id. It is doubtful that the Board would have decided to grant Clement
standing had he obtained 4,000 signatures from white males attesting that they
share his belief as Ritchie did to oppose Simpson's marks. See supra note 46.
94 See Boswell, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604 ("[Opposers do not allege that the use of
BLACK TAIL for adult entertainment magazines disparages or brings into
contempt or disrepute white males, the group to which opposer Clement belongs.");
id. at 1605 ("Clearly opposer Clement is not a member of the black or other minority
community; the allegations in the notice of opposition state just the opposite.").
95 Clement alleged that the BLACK TAIL mark was disparaging because
[any objective observer of race relations in the United States today
recognizes that violations of the rights of members of the African American
community, and acts of disrespect to members of said community by
members of the majority community, are likely to lead to (a) an
antagonistic attitude on the part of the many members of the minority
community, (b) a sharpening of racial bigotry on the part of any already
racially prejudiced members of the majority community, (c) a worsening of
relations between the two communities, and (d) in the worst case, violence
between members of the two communities.
Id. at 1604. In other words, Clement was alleging that the mark disparaged his
belief that a worsening of race relations would damage him as a member of the
majority community. The Board failed to explain how this type of damage is any
different than Ritchie's claim that Simpson's marks disparaged Ritchie's Christian
beliefs.
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IV. REGISTRATION OF THE "0. J." MARKS IN LIGHT OF SECTION
2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT
The sole issue before the Federal Circuit in Ritchie was
whether the opposer had standing. The ultimate issue, however,
is whether the marks are in fact scandalous under section 2(a).96
The question of how to determine whether a mark is scandalous
and the decisions that have evolved have attracted the attention
of several commentators97 and will not receive an exhaustive
review here. A brief review of the significant decisions regarding
scandalous marks is sufficient to put the Simpson marks in
context.
A. The Standard for Applying Section 2(a)'s "Scandalous"
Provision
Over fifty years ago, the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor court to the Federal
Circuit, applied a dictionary definition to determine whether a
mark is scandalous within the meaning of section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act.98 The court stated that a scandalous mark is
"shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety;
disgraceful; offensive... giving offense to the conscience or
moral feelings; exciting reprobation, calling out condemnation."99
This standard survives today and the Federal Circuit has
applied it in its own decisions. 100 In 1981, the CCPA first used
the often-repeated "substantial composite" rubric and went on to
say that the mark "must be considered in the context of the
marketplace as applied to only the goods or services described in
the application for registration."01 In other words, "whether an
applicant's mark is likely to offend must be judged not in
96 It appears that Simpson has abandoned the registration of these marks. See,
e.g., U.S. Trademark Serial No. 74551770, available at http://tess.uspto.gov; U.S.
Trademark Serial No. 74670837, available at http://tess.uspto.gov; U.S. Trademark
Serial No. 74670836 available at http'//tess.uspto.gov. Simpson can, however, re-
apply for registration at any time and hence, the question of whether the marks are
in fact scandalous may not remain moot.
97 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 5; Pace, supra note 20; Davis, supra note 37; M.
Christopher Bolen, When Scandal Becomes Vogue: The Registerability of Sexual
References in Trademarks and Protection of Trademarks and from Tarnishment in
Sexual Contexts, 39 IDEA 435 (1999).
98 See In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., In re Mavety Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
101 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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isolation but in the entire context of the marks' use."1 02 A
determination that a mark is scandalous is a legal conclusion
based on underlying facts. 10 3
B. The Shifting Tides of Social Tolerance for Alleged
Scandalous Marks
Within this less than perfect framework, courts and the
TTAB over the years have become increasingly tolerant of marks
alleged to be scandalous-the result of contemporary attitudes
toward topics and words that were once shunned. 104  For
example, in 1938, the CCPA held that the mark MADONNA for
use on wine was scandalous under section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act.105 The same year, it was also held that the use of QUEEN
MARY on women's underwear was scandalous. 10 6 Twenty-one
years later, the TTAB held that the mark bearing the name of a
Moslem sect, SENUSSI, was scandalous when used on
cigarettes.10 7 In 1968, the mark BUBBY TRAP for use on
woman's brassieres was held to run afoul of section 2(a) because
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defined the word
as "Breast, now often considered vulgar." 08 Forty years after
MADONNA was denied registration, the Board relied on the
CCPA's rationale'0 9 and held that the mark MESSIAS used on
wine and brandy was also scandalous.110
In contrast to these rejections, certain questionable marks
102 In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1221 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
103 See Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1371.
104 The Federal Circuit has recognized this shift in the public's attitude. See id
("[We must be mindful of ever-changing social attitudes and sensitivities .... Proof
abounds in nearly every quarter, with the news and entertainment media today
vividly portraying degrees of violence and sexual activity that, while popular today,
would have left the average audience of a generation ago aghast.").
105 See In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938) ("[We
also believe that there are many wine users who, knowing that the excessive use of
wine is a great evil and not uncommon, would be shocked by such use of said mark
upon wine, especially in view of the fact that such mark would probably be
displayed, among other places, in barrooms."). After the trademark statute was
revised in 1946, this mark was again denied registration for use on wines. See In re
P. J. Valckenberg, G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 334, 334-35 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
10, See Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 156, 156 (Comm. P. 1938).
107 See In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. 339, 339
(T.T.A.B. 1959).
108 In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. 443,443 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
109 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
11o See In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comercial Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L., 159
U.S.P.Q. 275, 276 (T.T.A.B. 1968).
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have survived a section 2(a) scandalousness challenge. For
example, as early as 1952, the mark LIBIDO for use on women's
perfumes was held not to be scandalous.' In 1973, the Board
concluded that the name WEEK-END SEX for a magazine
devoted to sexual relationships did not violate section 2(a).112
Specifically, the Board stated that "[iun resolving the issue as to
registerability of the mark.., consideration must be given to the
moral values and conduct fashionable at the moment, rather
than that of past decades . "..."113 The Board, apparently
concerned with the effect of its holding, warned that "what is
scandalous or immoral is merely a matter of degree and that this
decision should not be interpreted as a precedent for the
allowance of clearly immoral or scandalous matter as applied to
applicant's goods." 114 In 1988, the Board reversed the trademark
examining attorney's refusal to register BIG PECKER BRAND
for use on T-shirts despite the examiner's evidence that the third
definition of the word "pecker" in the 1981 version of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary was "penis - often
considered vulgar."115 The Board found it relevant that the
name was used in conjunction with a long-beaked bird and that
there was little evidence that people understood "pecker" to
M' See Ex parte Parfum L'Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. 481, 482 (Ch. P. Ex. 1952) ("It
is notorious that the perfume trade uses names and advertisements of a suggestive
nature and this matter has received some attention in the literature.").
112 See In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. 334, 335 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
113 Id. (emphasis added). The Board apparently did not feel that way the second
time it denied registration to a religious term applied to wine. See supra note 110. It
would be interesting whether a religious term used as a trademark on wine would
be denied registration today. Also, it is not clear what effect an "at the moment"
approach has, if any, on the res juicata implications of a prior determination of
scandalousness. In other words, if today an examiner were to reject the registration
of the MADONNA mark for use on wine, should the CCPA's 1938 Riverbank
Canning holding bind the Board? See supra note 105 and accompanying text. In at
least one instance, the Board did not feel bound by precedent, even by a reviewing
federal court.
We find the [decisions between 1938 and 1971] to be of little precedential
value in deciding the case now before us. Most of these older cases involved
a perceived offense to religious sensibilities .... Moreover, what was
considered scandalous as a trademark or service mark twenty, thirty or
fifty years ago may no longer be considered so, given the changes in
societal attitudes. Marks once thought scandalous may now be thought
merely humorous (or even quaint) ....
In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
114 Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. at 335.
115 In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (quoting WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1981).
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mean only penis.1 6 The concurring opinion in this decision
made the point that the applicant's success in selling the T-
shirts with this mark was evidence that it was not objectionable
to the public.117
Decisions in the 1990s have also shown a trend toward
greater tolerance for seemingly objectionable marks. In 1990,
the Board allowed the registration of the mark MOONIES
depicted with the two "00" in the shape of buttocks to be
registered for use on dolls that dropped their pants to expose the
buttocks. 118  The trademark examiner had rejected the
application on the grounds that it was scandalous matter that
disparaged the Unification Church founded by the Reverend Sun
Myung Moon.119  The Board also reversed an examiner's
rejection of a mark consisting of a condom decorated in the stars
and stripes of the American flag.120 The Board was persuaded by
the applicants' portrayal of their fight against AIDS as a
patriotic act.12' A year later, the Federal Circuit overturned the
Board's affirmation of an examiner's refusal to register the mark
BLACK TAIL for use on magazines depicting nude or scantly-
clad African-American women. 122  Despite recognizing the
weakness of the "substantial composite" standard, the Federal
Circuit felt compelled to follow the precedent laid down by the
CCPA in the 1981 McGinley decision 123 and thereby passed on
116 See id. at 1472.
117 See id. (Cissel, M., concurring). Applicants defending a scandalousness
challenge to their marks have not used this "commercial success" argument often.
118 See In re Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1654 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
119 See id. at 1653. The Board admitted that this decision was "a close case" and
that they were "not free of doubt," but nevertheless erred on the side of allowing the
registration because if the mark were in fact scandalous or disparaging to a group,
an opposition proceeding could be instituted after publication in the gazette. See id.
at 1654; see also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
120 See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1221 (T.T.A.B.
1993).
121 See id.
122 See In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The court in Mavety remanded the case to the Board to either support its contention
that the mark is scandalous or pass the mark for publication in the gazette. See id.
The Board ultimately let the mark pass for publication, which led to an opposition
proceeding by an African-American woman and a white man. See supra notes 85-95
and accompanying text.
123 See Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1371 ("While we recognize the inherent difficulty in
fashioning a single objective measure like a substantial composite of the general
public from the myriad of subjective viewpoints, we are duty bound to apply the
standard set forth by our predecessor court.").
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the opportunity to change the standard. In 1999, the Board
continued to display a high level of tolerance for potentially
objectionable marks by reversing the refusal to register an
animated depiction of a frog appearing to give the finger 124 and
the mark FRIGGIN' BARNYARD for use on refrigerator
magnets. 125
Although liberal attitudes have pervaded over the past
twenty years or so, some marks simply crossed the line. In 1981,
a mark consisting of a photograph of a nude man and woman
embracing in a way that exposed the male genitalia for use on a
newsletter devoted to such sexual topics as bisexuality,
masturbation, and "swinging" was held to be scandalous within
the meaning of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.126 The same
year, the mark BULLSHIT for use on apparel and accessories
was held to be scandalous and therefore unregisterable. 127
Similarly, the Board upheld Greyhound Bus Company's
challenge to the registration of a mark depicting a defecating
greyhound for use on shirts on grounds that it is scandalous. 128
In 1996, the Board upheld the examiner's refusal to register the
mark DICK HEADS for restaurant and bar services noting that
even with today's attitudes, the mark went too far.129 These
decisions illustrate that today the sky is not the limit when it
comes to registering an objectionable trademark. 130
124 See In re Bad Frog Brewery, Inc., 1999 TTAB LEXIS 86, at *2 (T.T.A.B.
Mar. 16, 1999).
125 See In re Friggin' Barnyard, 1999 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30,
1999).
126 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482, 487 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
127 See In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 863, 865 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
128 See Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639
(T.T.A.B. 1988). This was one of the only cases where the opposer was a corporate
entity rather than an individual or group of people.
129 See In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929, 1934 (T.T.A.B. 1996).
We believe that the evidence of record is sufficient, given the graphic
nature of the mark, to establish prima facie that the mark would be
offensive to the conscience or moral feelings of a substantial composite of
the general public, notwithstanding the fact that contemporary attitudes
towards sexual matters are more liberal than they were just a generation
ago.... [W]here registration is refused on the ground that a mark consists
of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter, the amount of proof
required to support the rejection depends upon the nature of the mark,
with less evidence being required in those cases involving the more
egregious marks.
Id.
130 Marks that contain outright vulgarity stand a good chance of being denied
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C. Simpson's Marks under the Scandalousness Test
In light of the decisions that have evolved over the past
several decades expressing contemporary liberal attitudes, it
would be highly unlikely that the marks 0. J., 0. J. SIMPSON,
and THE JUICE would be found to be scandalous within the
meaning of the section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Under the
"substantial composite" framework, the TTAB or the Federal
Circuit would be hard pressed to find that a substantial
composite of the general public regards these marks to be
"shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety;
disgraceful; offensive ... giving offense to the conscience or
moral feelings; exciting reprobation, calling out
condemnation."' 3' The general public's personal feelings about
Simpson should not be permitted to play a role in this inquiry.
The fact that Simpson has maintained his innocence and was
acquitted by a jury of the murder charges cannot be ignored
when considering these marks against the standard for
scandalous marks. Furthermore, even if members of the Brown
or Goldman families were to establish standing to oppose or
cancel these marks, they would hardly make up the "substantial
composite" that the current standard requires. Therefore, even
though Ritchie won the standing issue, he would most likely lose
a section 2(a) challenge to Simpson's marks on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Despite the broad language of the Lanham Act's provision
for opposing trademark registrations, there is a need for some
meaningful restrictions to help determine who has standing to
oppose or cancel a trademark registration. Without such
restrictions, the potential exists that mere intermeddlers will be
able to interfere with the legitimate registration of trademarks,
affecting both the federal courts and the TTAB with oppositions
on frivolous grounds. The Ritchie holding may also have a
chilling affect on future registrants of marks as the court has
opened the flood gates for members of the general public to
oppose or cancel registrations for tenuous and esoteric reasons.
registration under section 2(a). Such marks have included IF YOU'RE FULL OF
SHIT... YOU'RE A FRIEND OF MINE for sewer cleaning services, BITCH
WOMAN for greeting cards, SHITHEAD for assorted novelty items, and CROCK OF
S.H.I.T. for plant food. See Baird, supra note 5, at 719.
131 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
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With the Federal Circuit's holding in Ritchie, a disturbing
precedent has been set whose ultimate effect may not be evident
for years to come because of the uncommon nature of these types
of oppositions. It is not contended that the proposed framework
for analyzing the standing requirements in a scandalous
challenge to a mark establishes a "bright-line" test that is easily
applicable to all cases. A bright-line test is impossible given the
inherent subjectivity of the inquiry. The proposed standard
does, however, attempt to apply the section 13 standing
requirement of the Lanham Act with some restrictive effect-
something sorely lacking in the troublesome section 2(a)
statutory provision. It would not be surprising if Ritchie and the
TTAB's 1999 decision to cancel the Washington Redskins
trademark registrations serve as catalysts for a court to take
another hard look at the constitutionality of section 2(a).
The TTAB and the courts have been faced with a very
difficult task in deciding whether a trademark is scandalous
under section 2(a). The decisions that have emerged illustrate
how both federal and administrative trademark judges have
struggled to apply a very amorphous standard. Ultimately,
these decisions were driven largely by the social norms of the
times-the result of the subjective nature of what is scandalous
or immoral and the ever-evolving tenor of societal views.
Although the courts and the TTAB have shown greater, albeit
not unlimited, tolerance for the registration of questionable
marks, it seems highly unlikely in the modern age that the
underlying circumstances surrounding the notoriety of 0. J.
Simpson would render these marks scandalous within the
meaning of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. As the Federal
Circuit aptly put it, "[tloday's scandal can be tomorrow's
vogue." 32
132 In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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